From Citizenship to Cit(y)zenship
Cities within multi-level governance arrangements in Europe

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Yuri Kazepov (University of Urbino, Italy)

Introduction

The territorial dimension of social citizenship as well as the role of cities as building blocks of social inclusion strategies have for long been neglected perspectives in comparative social policy analysis. Conversely in urban studies the importance of national regulatory systems has been underplayed and the nested nature of cities has been for long disregarded. This is surprising given the fact that etymologically and historically the two terms are strongly correlated and cities were the social laboratories where citizens as bearer of rights and duties were forged (Weber, 1921; Häusserman and Haila, 2005). More generally, scholars took for granted that citizenship systems were tied to the national level and almost all comparative work which has been done after World War II based comparisons on national data. This, however, is less surprising. In fact, the inclusion in redistributive communities defining the borders of social citizenship developed mainly through nationally regulated social insurance programmes, which still absorb in all countries most resources targeted to social policies. There was also the belief that national policies, providing mainly income support, could provide the very basis for the equalization of living conditions across single countries ironing out local differences. Within this scenario services delivered at the local level or policies like social assistance – traditionally regulated locally – were considered as residual.

The deep structural changes that occurred since the end of the 1970s, ranging from changes in the socio-demographic structure of the population to the socio-economic changes of labour markets and production systems are well known and well investigated in all industrialized countries (Crouch, 2008). These changes challenged the social contract at the basis of citizenship regimes in European countries, affecting the functioning of welfare institutions (Rhodes and Mény, 1998) and their effectiveness. In particular, changes influenced the way in which social risks were produced undermining social policies’ ability to meet these new and old risks (Castel, 1995; Taylor-Gooby, 2005; Bonoli, 2006; Ranci, 2010).

In doing so, they kicked-off in the last two decades important changes in the organisation of social policies, which are re-drawing the boundaries of “social citizenship” bringing about a prominent role of cities. Indeed, as an answer to this state of affairs, an intense reform activity addressed most social policy areas in two directions: on the one hand by changing the territorial dimension at which social policies are designed, managed, funded and implemented. On the other hand, by increasing the number and type of actors involved in these very same activities (Kazepov, 2010). The joint effect of these two processes brought about a decentralization of regulatory powers and an increased role of non-governmental actors. Aim of this paper is to explore the potential impact of these changes on the boundaries of citizenship considering the subsidiarisation process and focusing on the relevance gained by cities. The mainstream belief implicit in the subsidiarity rhetoric and discourse Europe-wide is that going local and/or reaching multi-actors arrangements is the best solution for all problems. This might not be true per se but it makes anyway local welfare systems increasingly relevant in the definitions of the boundaries of social citizenship.

In order to grasp the implications of this scenario, scholars started to reconsider the territorial dimension in their analytical frameworks as a privileged perspective to understand the new role of cities and of local welfare systems. In particular, the processes of social cohesion/inclusion and the related policies are to be seen considered as crucial building blocks of social citizenship (Kazepov, 2005 2010; Andreotti et al. 2012; Eizaguirre et al. 2012). In this contribution, I will investigate the implications of changing scalar configurations and new governance arrangements, providing a territorialized overview of citizenship.
regimes in some European countries considering welfare systems both in their vertical and horizontal dimensions. In particular, this will be done considering the existing differences among citizenship systems as pre-structuring and enabling contexts in which specific outcomes might be favoured. Multiple sources will be used and I will be referring to the results of different projects I have been involved in the last decade. More specifically, in § 1 I address the relationship between citizenship, social policies and the production of scale, i.e. how defining new regulatory boarders defines new redistributive collectivities with spatial consequences. In § 2, I present four scalar regimes complementing a nationalized view of citizenship and social policy models with a so often neglected territorial dimension. § 3 provides an introductory comparative view on the similarities and differences concerning scale relations and the role of different actors in the different scalar regimes. The assumption here is that the subsidiarisation process is a converging normative rhetoric in most European countries’ social policy reforms but, has a diverging outcome. In the conclusions I provide an outlook of opportunities and criticalities related to the new role that cities and local welfare systems have in becoming social laboratories. There I am making a plea for considering the synergetic effect of policies at different territorial levels and the existing intra-national differences as key dimensions to understand the impact of the changes. The hypothesis is that the diverging impact the changes might have influences also the role of cities in the different contexts, the available resources and the capacities of social innovation.

1. Shifting boundaries of Citizenship, drivers of change, scales and ambiguities

As Jane Jenson (2007:58) underlines “Citizenship involves the expression of basic values about the responsibility mix, defining the boundaries of state responsibilities and differentiating them from those of markets, of families and of communities” (emphasis added). I tie in with Jenson, in particular considering that “through formal recognition of particular rights and duties (civil, political, social and cultural; individual and collective), a citizenship regime identifies those entitled to full citizenship status and those who only, in effect, hold second-class status as well as those who are not citizens. It establishes the boundaries as well as the borders of inclusion and exclusion of a political community”.

This regulative power pertained so far to the national state. Increasingly, however different scales are gaining relevance on this terrain as well, overcoming the mere role of executors and starting to erode this national prerogative. Cities in particular. The debate over the concept of scale can help us here in specifying the nature of the processes of change, allowing us to overcome also the idea that citizenship systems and state territorialities (and their sub-national levels) are a static background for the deployment of regulatory processes. In general terms, scale can be defined as “the result of marking territories (...) through boundaries and enclosures, documents and rules, enforcing agents and their authoritative resources” (Marston, Jones III & Woodward, 2005: 420). Scale might also be defined as “the nested hierarchy of bounded spaces of different size” (Delaney & Leitner, 1997: 93). As scales are changing, what becomes important is to understand the reasons and drivers of the changes, their directions and the potential consequences in the cultural, economic, political and social dimensions.

I won’t be able to address all these aspects thoroughly in this paper. Each of them would need an in-depth analysis which goes beyond my scope here. What I will highlight are a few aspects I consider crucial to frame our understanding of the current changes and some underlying ambiguities. The debate over the drivers of changes is difficult to disentangle given the inherent complexity of the processes themselves which can be both normatively and rhetorically framed in very different ways. There is agreement only on second order drivers, i.e. on the fact that contextual changes in the economic systems, in labour markets, in socio-demographic aspects, make old institutional settings inadequate in addressing new emerging needs and challenges. It is not my intention here to provide a full account of the ways in which these systems are interacting. I will rather try to establish some links among different strains of literature, to kick-off an

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interdisciplinary dialog on the issue and to see how they can mutually enrich each other in our understanding of the changes and their implications on the emerging role of cities and local welfare arrangements.

The debate over the issue of scale started in human and economic geography and other related disciplines sensible to “spatial” perspectives of social phenomena. It was the second half of the Nineties. Political-economy explanations argue that what drives the rescaling process has to do in general with the need of creating – within capitalism – conditions that are favourable to capital accumulation (Somerville, 2004). In particular, rescaling is seen as the attempt to find a new territorial fix to the development of capitalism (Peck and Tickell, 1994; Brenner, 2004), i.e. new scales at which regulatory settings favour the development of a neoliberal frame for economic activities. These changes reframed the meaning of territorial arrangements, that are not anymore considered as fixed as they were before. On the contrary, they are increasingly considered embedded into strategic relational networks (Jessop, 2008), i.e. into shifting power balances characterized by recursive negotiations, which change over time both the territorial regulatory arrangements and the actors involved in the negotiations about the boundaries of those regulations. This approach did not develop directly to explain changes in citizenship regimes, but the underlying logic is considered to be the same (e.g. Peck, 2001; Jessop, 2008).

What happens when we use the concept of scale in addressing citizenship regimes to be analysed through social policies? Social policies indeed play an important role in drawing citizenship regimes’ boundaries at the national level. Identifying access criteria to specific benefits they include or exclude individuals, families, communities, groups within specific boundaries. Defining boundaries is what Weber called a process of Schliessung. In providing benefits and rights welfare policies fuelled since the very beginning the construction of the Nation State, its legitimacy and identity (Moreno and Mc Ewan, 2005). Indeed, social policies structured so far redistributive communities thanks to the States’ capacity, ability and power to define regulative frames, allocating duties and rights and redistributing resources (Kazepov, 2010). From this perspective, the welfare state can be seen as the last step of the long-term historical development through which territorially bounded political communities came to introduce redistributive arrangements for their citizens (Ferrera, 2005). The issue at stake in this paper, is that the territorial bond of political communities is changing scale, shifting also State redistributive capacities in different directions, both upwards to supranational bodies (most prominently the European Union) and downwards to subnational bodies (regions and cities).

If we follow the critical political economy approach and apply it to social policy changes, we have to consider the rescaling processes and the multiplication of actors as an explicit answer of the capitalist system to the collapse of the positive-sum-game of economic growth and redistribution. This characterized and legitimated the capitalist system during the trente glorieuses in the post-war period, avoiding (rather than solving) redistributive conflicts by allowing most actors to improve their economic and social position. While I fully share the concerns of scholars highlighting the drawbacks of neo-liberalisation in both the political economy of scale and social policy analysis, I also think that the processes taking place are more complex than single ideologies are able to represent (Pickvance, 2008). Even though neoliberalization is seen as multi-faced and context related (Brenner et al. 2010) it is able to describe only a portion of the changes taking place. Considering it as the only process might underplay (or even neglect) the role of other co-existing drivers of the processes of change which in social policy analysis are gaining relevance. Indeed, we have to consider that social policies are changing because of many reasons. The drivers might be exogenous, i.e. demographic changes like aging, migration flows and family instability or labour market changes, like increasing women’s participation and long-term unemployment. Drivers might be also endogenous, i.e. due to the internal working logic of social policy institutions. For instance old age pensions or other insurance based policies rely on specific calculations of risk factors as they were specifically designed in a given context to respond to specific risks given certain conditions (Ferrera, 1998).

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2 The literature on the reasons why this happened and the relation with the welfare state is quite extensive and varies according to ideology, discipline and aims. See for instance Gough (1979) for the neo-marxist account, while see Murray (1984) for the neoliberal perspective.
Not all of these drivers are related to the neoliberalization of social policies even though most of them converge towards a wide critic to public national institutions, supposed to be conservative by nature, path dependent and prone to reproduce themselves, expensive, slow, fostering passivity and bringing about ineffective and inefficient policies (Oosterlynk et al. 2013). This contributed to kick-off the changes.

Examples of the complexity of the processes at stake and the inherent ambiguous character of the solutions provided are for instance activation policies. On the one hand, they are justified through a growing stigmatisation of dependency on welfare and fear of the related costs for the society (Serrano Pascual and Magnusson 2007). On the other hand, activation emerges out of the growing awareness that passive measures (alone) contribute to the consolidation of disadvantage. These two elements are co-present in most countries. However, they are unevenly distributed among different citizenship regimes and are supported by quite different discourses. In the first case, activation policies are presented as a necessity to contain financial and social costs of inefficient and passive unemployment measures (Sabatinelli, 2010: 78-79). Here the focus is on the duties of the beneficiaries (to work) and often entitlements and benefits are made conditional: citizens who receive income maintenance have to give something back. Policy-makers and politicians put forward these arguments with tax-payers, in order to reassure them that beneficiaries do not receive support unconditionally (Lind and Møller, 2006). In the second case the fundamental function that work has in shaping personality and in fostering the social inclusion and integration of persons is prominent. In this sense, access to activation programs is aimed at developing capabilities first and is seen as a right that the unemployed persons should be able to claim (even in front of a court). In this discourse the accent is on the empowerment of the individual beneficiary (Kazepov and Sabatinelli, 2006; Lødemel and Trickey, 2001).

Both perspectives share, disregard their differences, the decentralized design of activation measures and the involvement of new actors at the city level.

For the above mentioned reasons, I would tie in with state theorists and social policy analysts who tend to embrace a more middle-range theoretical approach, which is not developing a grand theory but an attempt to consider the co-existence of different ideologies (e.g. Leibfried and Zürn, 2005) and approaches, trying to push concrete measures in one direction or another. The outcome of their interplay is not that clear cut. On the one side it is not predetermined and is influenced by a pragmatic orientation of the actors involved in the policy making process and by the compromises they bargained. On the other side it is influenced by the more structural characteristics of European welfare systems. It is, indeed, these very characteristics and the underlying regulative principles that contribute to translate the common transformation processes of rescaling and governance into context specific outcomes and practices. This influences the allocation of resources and responsibilities in the different countries and local welfare systems. As Pawson and Tilley (1997:xv) put it, the right equation is: “reforms+context=outcomes”.

2. Towards a territorialized citizenship regimes perspective

To describe how citizenship regimes are territorially organized through specific social policy arrangements is a complex exercise. In order to make this exercise concrete I will relay on previous work (Kazepov, 2010; Kazepov and Barberis, 2012) carried out comparatively and make reference to a selection of social policies, in particular to social assistance schemes. The empirical basis for this exercise is an analysis of the institutional architecture of welfare regulation, funding, management and implementation1 in eight European countries. We classified these countries according to four main scalar frames (Kazepov, 2010: 51-63) which structure their social policies from the territorial point of view:

1. Countries in which a strong local autonomy is centrally framed;
2. Countries with a strong national/central frame;
3. Countries with a strong regional (or federal) frame;
4. Countries with a mix of frames in transition from one frame to another.

These vertical configurations intersect with the horizontal dimension of subsidiarity providing a quite

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1 For the details of the methodologies adopted see: Barberis et al. (2010: 386-388) and Barberis (2010).
complex picture. Public actors’ arrangements with civil society, third sector actors and private providers at the different territorial levels vary and play varying roles in the different regulatory contexts. In the following sections we will shortly illustrate the main characteristics of these four scalar regimes, will relate them to the different welfare typologies and provide an overview of the broader changes they underwent in the last few decades, showing that the local dimension is the only one which gained prominence in all countries.

2.1. Local autonomy centrally framed countries

In “Local autonomy centrally framed” countries the regulative responsibility, i.e. legislative power, belongs to the central state, while management and funding of social policies in general and assistance benefits in particular is a responsibility of municipalities to which a high degree of autonomy in implementing the benefits themselves is granted. This autonomy is “framed” by the central state through several institutional tools, i.e. national guidelines on how to implement policies, the definition of a basic amount for social assistance benefits, etc. Institutional stakeholders play a role in national bargaining, while private providers have a limited and clearly contracted role in the delivery of some measures at local level. Finland, Norway and Sweden – as an example of the social-democratic Nordic welfare system – are characterized by this scalar frame. Sellers and Lidström describe these countries as being characterized by nationalized local governments (2007: 622). They have, in comparative terms, strong labour market and employment policies, a universal system of minimum benefits with income-related supplements and a single general scheme granting a legally enforceable right to social assistance. This implies that local governments in cities cannot legally deny benefits and services for those fulfilling eligibility criteria (Minas and Øverbye, 2010). Rights (and national standards as well as monitoring capacities) are established in national framework laws or guidelines, granting a high level of autonomy to local governments and street-level administrators in delivery and management. Municipalities retain also a high autonomy in managing and funding policies. This autonomy, however, is embedded in a nationally defined regulatory context, which contributes – through the direct provision of many benefits and services or specific guidelines – to keep territorial differentiation under control. In general, planning and basic eligibility criteria are defined at the national level, while management and delivery are defined at local level.

As far as the horizontal dimension is concerned, the scope of private actors is strongly contractualized and targeted to the provision of individualized activation measures, linked to the labour market. Hence, the primacy of public actors remains largely uncontested, although in some cases it is complemented with quasi-market delivery patterns. In general terms, we can affirm that State redistribution keeps a major role, even though with increasing conditionality in access in recent reforms.

The vertical dimension, usually involves just two tiers (national and municipal), with a division by function between the legislative and planning powers on the one side (state), and the management and delivery responsibility on the other side (Municipality). Mid-level agencies and bodies (namely Counties) have been the main losers in the rescaling process, and their responsibilities have been given to Municipalities and the State during the 1990s: the first become more and more responsible (also for a consistent part of financing) in order to make local authorities accountable, while state-level agencies (e.g. the National Board of Health and Welfare in Sweden) have responsibility for the assessment of outcomes, thus counteracting municipal autonomy. As a consequence, decentralisation is complemented with control over local authorities, that in the last years is somehow shaped as a re-centralising trend (e.g. by the definition of national thresholds and guarantees).

Despite such degree of State coordination, territorial variation is possible as framework laws provide enough room for territorial differences. Local social and economic differences are relevant as it is the freedom left to municipalities in management, delivery and financing. In Finland, Norway and Sweden differences are clear also along an urban/rural (and sometimes South/North) divide, which affects available resources (labour market and chances of employability; organizational issues like economies of scale and the number and qualification of service providers). Though, the State defines at least a basic common ground, while differences often concern services above this minimum standard (Kazepov and Barberis, 2012). In general, we can say that the State retains its primacy and decentralisation takes place with strong attention paid to control over differentiation processes. This characteristic has an impact also on the organization of social assistance and on the attempts to counteract territorial variation that can be more
effective than in other contexts (e.g. than in regionally or federally framed countries).

2.2. Centrally framed countries

In “centrally framed” countries the legislative power belongs to the central state in a context in which also the degree of freedom allocated to the sub-national territorial levels, having managing and funding responsibility, is very low: access criteria, amount, duration etc. are strictly regulated by the central state. This implies a strong limitation of the intra-national variation and social assistance benefits almost of the same across the country. Civil society has a bargaining role at national level, with further involvement in national measures and at local level as far as they meet national standards. France – an example of the corporatist-conservative continental European welfare system – is characterized by centrally framed policies. It had, until 1988, a social assistance system characterized by categorical schemes for specific social groups, deriving from a detailed but fragmented state regulation of social assistance. The introduction of the Revenue Minimum d’Insertion (RMI) as a general national scheme, foreseeing income support and socio-professional insertion, changed the outline of the French social protection system. The RMI was rather selective and played a residual role in the welfare architecture (which is still based on a set of category-based social minima). Notwithstanding a process of decentralization of financing and delivery, benefits and criteria are still regulated in detail by a national legislation, with a strong limit on local autonomy. In this sense social policies are centrally framed. This does not always limit local discretionary power, due to the huge amount of partly competing and overlapping category-based measures, but keeps a clear source of regulation. The 2009 reform introducing the Revenue de Solidarité Active (RSA) has strengthened the emphasis on the individual responsibility and employability of beneficiaries, but also tried to overcome some of the problems related to the fragmented access to rights.

2.3. Regionally framed countries

In “regionally framed” countries the regulatory responsibility belongs to the subnational level, which has an exclusive legislative responsibility in the field of social policies and social assistance in particular. As far the managing and funding responsibilities are concerned, this group of countries is characterized by different sub-national arrangements partly related to the specific state form (from federalism to regionalism). The real divide, however, is played by the more – or less – active role of the state. From this point of view, Italian and Spanish social assistance schemes – as examples of the South-European or Mediterranean “familistic” welfare system – show low and locally defined benefits characterized by poor formal entitlements and a weak role of the state. In general, no legally enforceable social rights within national framework laws or fixed national minimum standards exist. Eardley et al. (1996) identified some common characteristics like a “localized, discretionary relief, linked to social work and with wider kin obligations” (p. 170), together with a small number of beneficiaries due to budget constraints, stigmatisation and high social workers’ discretionary power. As a consequence, regional and local disparities are particularly high in comparative terms, considering also the regionalization process that occurred in the last few decades. These features tie in with the overall characteristics of the respective welfare systems which, despite the strong post-war centralism, shifted a great deal of regulatory capacity to the regions since the second half of the 1970s. From the territorial point of view policies are, therefore, to a large extent regionally framed, highly segmented and targeted to particular categories. Unlike countries of the corporatist welfare system, the regional differentiation does not take place within a frame of relatively well guaranteed rights. On the contrary, cities are having often a high autonomy in the design, management and implementation of social assistance schemes. Indeed, in terms of intra-country variations these countries present – with a few exceptions, like Germany – a strong territorial differentiation both of the organizational forms and of the amount of the benefits. Other factors might play also a role, like the size of the country (see Obinger, Leibfried and Castles, 2005) and the more or less active role of the state (Kazepov, 2010). Switzerland, for instance, belongs also to this scalar regime but is different from Italy and Spain, not only in the size of the country, but also in the generosity of the measures (Obinger, 1999) and overall provisions. All these differences contribute to structure subsidiarity in a substantially different way: more generous benefits, in a smaller country with a
stronger federal structure fostering active forms of subsidiarity (e.g. Switzerland and Germany). Despite these differences, these countries share some organizational features. First, they all have a second legislative tier besides the State: Kantons, Comunidades autonomas and Regioni have exclusive legislative power on many social policy and social assistance related issues. Consequently many practices show some degree of similarity, especially when we contrast them with Nordic countries. On the one side, national/Federal influence and/or control on planning and eligibility criteria is very limited, as it usually takes place at regional level, while management and delivery are delegated to the local welfare system. Furthermore, even though some obligations are national, the actual enforcement is taking place at regional or even local level. As a consequence, regionally framed countries are characterized by a strong territorial fragmentation. Within this picture Italy is one of the few EU countries without a national minimum income scheme (together with Greece). In Spain regional schemes have been introduced in the last decade by the Comunidades Autonomas, with wide degrees of variability in coverage and access. The same applies to Switzerland, where the Francophone cantons (e.g. Vaud and Geneva) introduced measures inspired by the French RMI, called “Revenue Minimum de Réinsertion” (RMR), while German-speaking cantons didn’t.

At the horizontal level, private actors play – in comparison to countries of other scalar regimes – a very important role, sometimes displaying very strong lobbying activities and a substitutive role towards the State in different policy areas. As a matter of fact, besides their role in the contracted-out delivery of some measures, they are also involved in management, planning and decision-making. In Switzerland, the Swiss Konferenze for Social Welfare (an important Ngo) provides guidelines for nation-wide standards of welfare provisions, while local bargaining arenas involving private providers play a role especially in employability projects for the disadvantaged. In Italy the role of Caritas and similar organizations is relevant both in the delivery and in the negotiation of measures, for example, the “area plans” (piani di zona), a negotiation arena for public and private actors on the goals and priorities of local social measures. Hierarchical or quasi-market regulation available in Nordic countries or in France, with quite clear-cut roles for NGOs, are replaced in regionally framed countries by more complex network arrangements, with serious problems of coordination in arenas where a pervasive and continuous bargaining among actors can be inefficient and even hinder welfare development (Obinger, Leibfried and Castles, 2005).

2.4. Countries with a mixed frame in transition

In countries with “Mixed frames in transition” regime changes caused a path-break, with new developments not yet being fully institutionalized to define a clear cut trajectory. External and internal differences produce a range of features belonging both to countries with centrally framed policies and countries with a high local autonomy. Regulative responsibility belongs usually to the national state (as in § 3.2), but in some countries local welfare systems gain momentum (as in § 3.3). This increases the territorial variation, even though to a lesser extent. In this context, civil society can play a broad role at local level to sew up structural holes in the new territorial configurations.

Countries characterized by mixed frames in transition – of which Poland is a good example – show how radical political changes also imply an important scale change, bringing about devolution processes and a reformed sub-national organization of powers. This process also affected the definition of social assistance and its practices. Notwithstanding the steering role of the national government, in fact the social assistance national framework in these countries interacts with a decentralizing structure, characterized by a fragmented power allocation and a relevant discretionary power of local social workers (Cerami, 2006). Therefore, as far as the scalar and governance trends are concerned, countries in transitional scalar regimes can be described as countries that – also through the role of the EU – are building a more path-breaking multilevel governance model. The centrally-framed heritage is challenged by an ongoing plural and fragmented decentralization which make the directions of change partly unclear.

In general, Central and Eastern European countries did not prioritize the institution of mid-level authorities. In this, Poland was quite an exception when the reform of public administration was kicked off in 1990 (Kulesza, 2002). On the other hand, Poland is also a large country that entered the transformation period with a significant regional diversity along the rural/urban and agriculture/industrial divide.
3. Changing scales, path dependency, regime shifts and cities at the forefront

As we maintained in the previous sections, scalar regimes – despite their institutionally defined territorial fixes – are not static. The magnitude and the direction of changes, however, might vary and should not be taken for granted. One example is that we should be careful in considering the mainstream plea of decentralization as a homogenous trend. On the contrary, scalar regime changes should be considered in the frame of deeply rooted State normative foundations and the overall path dependency of the different countries’ welfare systems. This does not undermine the fact that cities are becoming more important, it just calls attention to the differences in this process. Figure 1 exemplifies the main changes in the territorial configurations of three selected policies for the four cases we will briefly refer to: Italy, Finland, France and Poland.4

**Figure 1 “Scalar shifts in selected social policies in four European countries”**

Figure 1 clearly shows that some countries display a stronger resilience to change than others and even where changes are deep enough, the role of different scales can diverge. In Finland, for instance, local authorities gained momentum since the mid Nineties, even though the role of the State (e.g. in terms of controls and guidance) has been reaffirmed by recent reforms. The French case shows that decentralization processes touched only marginally the general power balance among scales, since the national State did hardly lost any of its prerogatives. Italian welfare reforms on the contrary paved the way for a major scalar regime shift from a centralist state (though affected by large local variability) towards a quasi-federalist configuration. In Poland, the political regime shift and the EU access went side by side with the construction of new scalar configuration, even though there is still no clear (scale) winner and some confusion in the (scalar) division of tasks is consolidating (Kazepov, 2010).

The only common trend across the four countries is the increasing role of cities, i.e. the increasing role of sub-national authorities in structuring their local welfare systems. This trend, however, has not the same meaning and and implies also different relations among scales: indeed changes are not necessarily the result of a zero-sum game and the national State can remain the main player in France, despite the upsurge of the Départements. It can also regain relevance in Finland (see the U-shape) and decline in Poland and Italy. It is within these general trends that single policy reforms (e.g. social assistance) take place and play out their consequences (Kazepov and Barberis, 2012).

3.1. A Comparative analysis of relationship between scale and governance through the lens of discretion

What is the relationship between scale and governance in these subsidiarization processes? Why does the joint effect of both trends bring about a new role for cities? If we want to analyse and understand this relationship we have to consider the complex interplay between the institutional allocation of responsibilities among tiers of government and the heterogeneity of the actors involved in designing, managing, financing and delivering single policies. As I won’t be able to provide a precise account of this complexity, I will consider the level and type of discretionary power available to practitioners as an extreme case to test the emerging cit(y)zenship regimes and speculate on the potential risks that might emerge in cities at the level of local welfare systems.

No doubt, that in every country legislation provides room for a certain degree of discretion to ease implementation at the local level, however, despite this commonality, the specific institutional architecture

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4 In order to provide a broader picture, rescaling trends reported in Figure 1 consider three policies: 1) social assistance, 2) activation policies on the labour market; 3) elderly care. These are the policy fields covered by the Rescaling project and identify three increasingly important areas undergoing relevant changes. Total scores reflect the importance of the different scales in relation to three aspects: a) regulation; b) management and 3) funding. For each of these aspects the scores range from “full responsibility/major role” (=1) to “no (or very limited) responsibility at all (=0). Shared/partial responsibility provides a score of 0.5. The total score, thus ranges between 0 (no role in any policy area and activity) to 9 (full responsibility and major role in every policy area and activity). Scores have been calculated at different points in time in order to visualize the rescaling process. For more info see Barberis et al. (2010: 386-388) and Kazepov and Barberis (2012).
of single policies provides actors and claimants with different degrees of freedom and different resources (in kind and cash) through different procedures, but also different rights and duties.

Considering the relevant literature (Lipsky, 1980; Galligan, 2002; Evans and Harris, 2004; Saruis, 2012) and the results of the rescaling project (Kazepov, 2010; Kazepov and Barberis, 2012), it is possible to identify three main types of discretionary power street-level bureaucrats retain: 1) *intra-lem discretion*, in which the professional skills are used to determine the level of the benefits and the implementation of the single measures within a given set of formally available options; 2) *extra-lem discretion*, in which the elusiveness of rules, their overlaps and gaps allow a more interpretative role of practitioners (Sosin, 2010); 3) *contra-lem discretion*, in which the criteria for decision-making are left aside by the practitioner, who acts against the law to support (or not) the claimant, e.g. when there is no way of binding the decision to a claimable right or formalized procedure (Kazepov and Barberis 2012: 218-224).

In Table 1 some of the complexities of different social assistance models are summarized, in particular considering the role played by the relevant actors in different scalar regimes.

*Insert Table 1 “The role of actors in different scalar regimes in Europe” here.*

In countries with a high local autonomy centrally framed – like the Nordic countries – we have a two-tier system, in which cities retain management and delivery, while design is national. For some measures (e.g. housing benefits) we have a direct role of the state often exerted through decentralized bodies. As far as the actors involved the picture is more articulated. In general, we can say that in Nordic countries social partners (employers and trade unions) are a relevant lobbying group at the national level, while delivery at the local level can be often characterized by quasi-market local regulation. There, usually street level bureaucrats retain *intra-lem discretion*: more or less binding national guidelines, sometimes complemented by local guidelines, steer street-level bureaucrats’ decision-making. Transparency and accountability are dealt with through “one-door-policies”, appealability and standard assessment of access criteria and decision making-processes. Usually the lean structuring of multilevel governance potentially allows quite specific attribution of responsibility, responsiveness and rather defined steps through service provision. As a consequence, we can find a common base (mainly cash) defined by national rules and clear-cut rights. In addition to that, specific resources and/or services can be provided thanks to the existing autonomy cities have in complementing national measures. These depend also on the role played by social workers’ discretion in developing individualized and tailored paths of labour and/or social re-insertion. Intra-national variation between cases is hence usually given by a share of local flexibility in the framework of national standards.

In centrally framed countries – like in France – the situation is not so different if examined from the vertical point of view. What makes a difference is the much lower degree of autonomy cities have, since a significant role is also played by decentralized state authorities (e.g. Prefectures and the services déconcentrés of the Ministries, included the Departmental-level branches of the Ministry of Welfare and Health). Also, the role of social partners and stakeholders is stronger in France, e.g. in the management of some insurance-based measures like the National Family Allowance Office (CNAF). Compared to the Nordic countries an increasing role of complementary types of intervention organized through public-private partnerships is also foreseen. The role of private (including voluntary) actors, however, remains mainly complementary in providing *in-kind* services (Feiock and Andrew, 2006; Bergmark and Minas, 2010).

In centrally framed countries, the structure is similar to the Nordic countries, though with a stronger idea of state primacy and a more dependent role of local authorities. The consequence is a quite waveriing interpretation of local variability, that in such a large country like France can happen. Local/urban “special” policies are anyway somehow controlled centrally, while spaces for local adaption are mainly up to the increasing role of Départements, which are, however, enjoying little autonomy due to budgetary constraints.

In regionally framed countries – like Italy, Spain and Switzerland – the national level only provides some general orientation services, and the role of Regioni, Comunidades Autonomas and Kantons is particularly strong, with a remarkable intra-national differentiation of rules. The way in which cases are addressed and managed is often very different due to the different rules and strategies that subnational tiers of government autonomously adopted. In all three countries, the role of private non-for-profit actors is very
strong, for instance, in suggesting eligibility criteria (SKOS guidelines in Switzerland), in delivering their own measures, more or less coordinated with public ones (especially in Spain and Italy). The picture is quite complex and their intervention has often a low financial coverage through public funds (Ranci, 2002). Sometimes there is also a certain degree of ambiguity among complementary and substitutive roles and an acknowledgement of the autonomous role of social (and market) forces. This is especially true in Spain and Italy where the substitutive role is wide, as some private (third-sector) organizations, including voluntary ones, also provide last resort services due to the lack of public provisions.

In countries in transition – like Poland – the prominent role of the state, legacy of the previous regime, interacts with increasingly overlapping and not clear-cut responsibilities of regions and cities. This differs from the Nordic two-tier system, and also from the French model, where state rule is much more direct. Often there is limited cooperation between labour offices (PUP) and social assistance offices (MOPS). This implies that employment activation programmes and social integration programmes often overlap with no coordination and/or clear division of labour.

In regionally framed and transition countries discretion is more extra legem and is characterized by a higher degree of variation as it implies an interpretation by street-level social workers on what to do and how to do it. In some cases it is a complement to the intra-legem discretion (as in Switzerland), in others it exists because social worker’s interpretation is taking place within an uncertain and complex set of available measures as in Italy. Here, discretion is often used as a way to promote “deserving” categories or to dissuade “undeserving” ones. Cases of rule-breaking (contra-legem) or wide autonomy concerning the choice of targets are rare, but some can be found in Polish, Spanish and Italian cases. The fact that extra-legem discretion is more likely to occur in regionally-framed countries depends upon the fact that social assistance is organized through a larger number of institutional actors with intertwined roles, overlapping responsibilities and multiple veto-points (Ferrera, 2008). As a consequence, differences in the degrees of discretion already start at the definition of the basic cash benefit, which is defined – in most cases – by regional or sub-regional authorities. This remarkable disparity is true whatever the level of the benefit is: generous (Switzerland) or low (Spain and Italy). In the latter countries, the higher level of discretion, does not only refer to the level of the monetary benefit, but also to the entitlement itself. In these countries, even the administration of existing national measures (e.g. minimum income in Spain and elderly care in Italy) is affected by considerable local variation, due to an unclear “division of labour” between the different scales involved. This implies that living in different cities often entails different rights, provisions and services. In contexts where social assistance is more fragmented and the public last safety net weaker, primary social networks and the volunteer sector act as functional substitutes. This further increases the complexity of the system, decreasing predictability and accountability of the involved actors.

The relationship between the low degree of institutionalisation of decision-making arenas, the multitude of levels and actors involved and discretion is complex and still needs to be further analysed and refined. Indeed it is true that we cannot affirm that regionalization is per se a cause of a weak organisation and loose rights. It depends on other intervening factors like the existing checks and balances between territorial levels and actors, their degree of formalization, and the overall efficiency and effectiveness of the respective welfare state. Actually, among regionally framed countries, Swiss and German social assistance measures are a good example of a more effective institutionalized solution than the different Italian and Spanish regional arrangements. This is true besides the generosity of their measures and relates more to their organizational form.

In countries with heterogeneous institutional arrangements the negotiation between actors is usually wide-ranging, and not focused just on the benefit provision, nor on individual cases. Private actors, non-profit charitable organizations and stakeholders can often have a word, for example, on eligibility criteria and on the design of measures, since they have a rich know-how and are not strictly bounded by public resources and specific roles. Such institutional complexity mirrors a persistent internal social or territorial differentiation that might affect negatively the role of social policies in the construction of social cit(ycl)zenship.
Opportunities and criticalities of subsidiarity trends in European citizenship regimes

The territorial re-organization of citizenship systems shows undoubtedly converging patterns in the prominent role cities are gaining. The same is true for new governance arrangements. Indeed, all countries – even though with different timing and pace – show an increasing importance of non-state actors. This converging trend bears opportunities and criticalities which are emerging from their interplay with the different path-dependent institutional settings.

Opportunities are mainly related to the new role that non-state actors are gaining. In particular, the options for local experimentation during which actors can find new solutions have widened. This offers freedom for grassroots action allowing the valorisation of existing differences and contributing to legitimize those political choices which impact on the very same actors and territories (Mouleart et al. 2007; Silver et al. 2010). If these characteristics are met, cities become again social laboratories for social policy innovation (Gerometta et al. 2005), even though the need of up-scaling the best solutions emerges as a substantial, but still neglected issue.

Criticalities are related to the ways in which the territorial re-organization of social policies and the new governance arrangements modify how vulnerability and social risks are produced and institutionally addressed. In particular we can highlight the following criticalities:

a) the coordination of the actors involved in the policy. The multiplication of both private and public actors at the different territorial levels triggers the need of coordination and – at the same time – opens up opportunities for discretion, for potential conflicts and policy implosion (reciprocal vetoes, inability of taking relevant decisions, policy stagnation,...) (Øverbye et al., 2010);

b) the institutionalization of increasing disparities among sub-national territories in general and cities in particular. The increasing localisation of decision-making processes consolidates differentiated practices, but also the development of differentiated regulations, legitimizing the development of local welfare systems which might institutionalize uneven treatment;

c) the accountability of the decision-making process. The multiplication of actors and their territorial fragmentation tends to weaken the democratic control over actors’ responsibilities within the decision making process, the management and the implementation (Crouch 2004; Bovens, 2007; Brodkin, 2008);

d) the spread of blame-avoiding strategies of nation states passing “the buck” of retrenchment to sub-national governments, cities or non-public actors. This fosters passive subsidiarity i.e. delegation of social responsibilities to local welfare systems without targeted public resources. This has been also called decentralization of penury from the state towards cities (Mény and Wright, 1985).

e) the ambiguities of civil society’s role. On the one side the risk of a representativeness fallacy, i.e. assuming that civil society “represents” the poor and is oriented to the “public good”. On the other, the fact that civil society reproduces public rigidities when it institutionalizes;

f) the production of unstable innovative practices, which might have no wider impact if not up-scaled from the urban to at least a regional level. Does upscaling and decontextualizing affect the degrees of innovativeness and are these initiatives deemed to fail?

These criticalities are related one another but distribute differently among European countries. In particular, their unequal distribution depends on the interplay between the intra-national structural socio-economic divides and the socio-political specificities and reforms, which grant different degrees of freedom to regions and cities and actors in a given country (see Table 2).

The converging trend towards decentralization is accompanied in some countries also by an increasing degree of control exerted by higher instances (e.g. in most Nordic countries). In particular in some countries (e.g. Norway) central institutions take up the coordination challenge with soft governance tools and new supervision and evaluation instruments, allowing them to monitor and assess the performance of local and regional welfare systems (Øverbye et al. 2010). Calling for more coordination, however, implies greater investment in negotiation, which in turn not necessarily leads to transparent and accountable decision making processes. From this point of view, the idea of a zero-sum game between centralization and decentralization seems inadequate to grasp the ongoing changes, which need to be contextualized considering intra-national variation and the way it interacts with the redistributive capacities of social policies. Here Finland, France, Italy and Poland show relevant differences. In particular, Italy shows dispersion rates up to nearly four times higher than all other countries in all main socio-economic indicators
(Kazepov and Barberis, 2012) and one of the lowest redistributive capacities of welfare provision: only 19.7% of low income families in 2011 moved above the threshold thanks to welfare transfers. In France it was 43.3% and in Finland 50% (Eurostat, 2013).

Cities as laboratories of social innovation

The spread of rescaling and governance processes translates in a growing role of cities and local welfare systems, which are increasingly asked to act as laboratories where new solutions can and should be developed. The mainstream assumption is that local welfare systems should promote social innovation, which will be able to overcome most of the mentioned criticalities. In particular by:

a) satisfying new social needs or old needs in new ways;
b) empowering and mobilizing actors, reinforcing society’s capacity to act for its own enhancement and fostering participation;
c) transforming social relations among actors, identifying those who might be more effective and efficient in achieving social goals through social means.

Civil society, in particular the third (non-for-profit) sector, is seen here as the main collective actor, the *deux ex machina* overcoming public institutions’ deficits thanks to flexibility, efficiency, speed in achieving social goals through innovative practices (Oosterlynk et al. 2013). However, the situation is not that clear cut and plays out differently in different countries, where synergies among public institutions, private organizations and civil society, as well as the conditions to realize them are intrinsically different (Oosterlynk et al. 2013). But what are the prerequisites cities and their local welfare systems have to fulfill in order to construct socially innovative welfare arrangements involving civil society at large? This paper has, so far, provided some contextual elements to be used in answering this question. Public institutions need to undergo relevant transformations and develop a new organizational culture, new competences, new instruments and tools to coordinate and manage complex welfare mixes. This is not an easy task as these prerequisites are not given but need to be developed during the transformation itself!

In general, the strong accent recent reforms put on devolution, decentralization and active welfare policies provided cities and their local welfare systems with new regulatory powers which, in a context of increased overall fragmentation, brought about the need for coordination of the multitude of different actors. The degrees of autonomy local and regional citizenship systems have and the resources at their disposal, however, still rely to a large extent on overall regulations existing at national level. In fact, citizenship systems in general and social policies in particular retain often a multiple territorial nature, which we should always keep in mind. *Passive contributory based policies* (e.g. unemployment benefits) are still defined mainly at the national level in almost all countries considered, while *activation policies and in-kind provisions* are increasingly defined at the local level. It is for this very reason that the national states’ influence on urban policies is still relevant in all European cities (Kazepov, 2005) and local welfare systems are more coherent with national welfare systems than one might expect (Kazepov, 2010). Table 2 shows the role of states’ redistributive capacity and the intra-national differences in relation to the different types of social innovation in cities and their main risks.

*Insert Table 2 “Contextual indicators and types of social innovation in cities and their risks” here.*

The real challenge plays out in the interplay between the different contextual conditions and the types of social innovation which emerge. This defines who is included and who is excluded at different territorial levels and the way in which rescaling and the new governance arrangements affect the outcome. From this point of view European countries provide interesting perspectives into the potentially positive and negative consequences of the subsidiarisation process of social policies ranging from empowering practices and participatory configurations to differentiated landscapes of rights (and duties). A territorialized view of citizenship systems helps understanding the different roles played by cities and local welfare systems in the processes of inclusion and exclusion. Also the emergence of joined-up-government processes in which more actors (public, but also private) acquire more functions, without hollowing out the role of other actors requires new bargaining and bridging skills and functions which are unequally distributed. Coordination becomes a key cross-cutting issue which requires a conscious meta-governance thinking about policy
networks (Jessop, 2002; Kazepov and Barberis, 2012: 244). If cities and local welfare systems are left alone in this process, inequality is deemed to increase and all potential of social innovation will be lost.

References


